






SOURCES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH  




Department of Agricultural Economics and Management,  




David J. Sedik 
Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia,  







Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural &Applied Economics Association 












Copyright 2009 by Zvi Lerman and David J. Sedik. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright 
notice appears on all such copies. 
 SOURCES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN CENTRAL ASIA 




The paper examines agricultural production and productivity growth in two Central Asian countries 
– Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Both countries are characterized by a significant shift of resources from 
the traditional Soviet model of collective agriculture to more market-compliant individual and 
family farming. In both countries, the beginning of the policy-driven switch to family farming 
around 1997 coincided with the beginning of recovery in agriculture, namely resumption of 
agricultural growth after a phase of transition decline since 1991. In addition to growth in total 
agricultural production, we also observe significant increases in productivity of both land and labor 
since 1997. These observations suggest that productivity growth may be attributable to the changes 
in farming structure in Central Asia. To check this conjecture we assess the sources of growth by 
applying the standard Solow growth accounting methodology. Using time series of country statistics 
for farms of different organizational forms, we decompose the growth in output into growth in the 
resource base (extensive growth) and growth in productivity (intensive growth). Solow growth 
accounting clearly shows that, first, much of the growth at the country level is attributable to 
increases in productivity rather than increases in resources and, second, the increases in productivity 
in family farms (especially household plots) outstrip the increases in productivity in former 
collective and state farms. These findings confirm that the recovery of agricultural production in 
Central Asia has been driven largely by productivity increases, and it is the individual farms that are 
the main source of agricultural productivity increases. 
 
Keywords: agricultural productivity, agricultural growth, family farms, corporate farms, 
comparative performance, agrarian reforms, transition countries, Central Asia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan 
 
JEL classification: P27, P31, P32, Q15, R14 Introduction 
One of the items on the agricultural reform agenda in former Soviet republics forming the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) involves transformation from the traditional corporate 
farms to substantially smaller family or individual farms. This transformation is motivated by the 
theoretical incentive analysis of farms of different organizational forms in market economies, which 
suggests that family farms can be expected to achieve higher levels of productivity and efficiency 
than corporate farms (Allen and Lueck 2002).  
Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan  embarked  on  the  process  of  land  reform  in  1991-1992, 
immediately after gaining independence. However, the first years were characterized by hesitant and 
indecisive  progress,  largely  attributable  to  lack  of  experience  with  the  huge  task  on  hand.  In 
Tajikistan in particular further difficulties were created by the civil war that raged in this country 
until 1997. After 1997-98, however, both countries began to implement resolutely a comprehensive 
program of land reform and farm restructuring that culminated in a massive shift of agricultural land 
and agricultural production to small individual and family farms. These achievements of land reform 
in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are particularly remarkable because the two countries are generally 
regarded as slow reformers and are assigned low ranks for their reform performance by international 
organizations (Csaki and Kray 2005).  
The ultimate goal of land reform in all transition countries is to increase the incomes and the 
standard of living of their large rural populations, which rely on agriculture for a substantial part of 
the family budget. Every CIS transition country attempts to achieve this goal by encouraging growth 
in the agricultural sector and, whenever possible, improving farm productivity. In this paper, we 
accordingly analyze agricultural growth and productivity improvements in two specific Central 
Asian countries. The analysis is based on official country statistics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the 
sources for which are listed under References at the end.  Agricultural development 
Agricultural development in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as represented by changes in Gross 
Agricultural Output (GAO), exhibits four distinct stages (Figure 1)  – robust Soviet growth (up to 
1980), stagnation during the Gorbachev period (1980-1990), transition decline (from 1991 to 1996-
97), and finally recovery (since 1997-98). The transition decline that began in 1990-91 exhibited the 
classic features of decline observed in all post-Soviet countries: the disintegration of the traditional 
Soviet agricultural system, with its rigidly planned supplies of inputs to and purchases of outputs 
from collective and state farms at fixed prices, caused a dramatic fall in agricultural production after 
1991. This fall in production was largely due to the fall in the use of purchased inputs, including 













Figure 1. Growth of agricultural production in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 1965-2007 (GAO in 
percent of 1965). 
 
The transition decline was much more pronounced in Tajikistan than in Uzbekistan. By 1997 
agricultural production in Tajikistan had fallen to levels not seen since the early 1960s. The 
perception of the transition decline in the 1990s was undoubtedly all the more negative because it 
was preceded by decades of steady agricultural growth during the Soviet period, as the GAO index 
in both countries doubled between 1965 and 1988, despite the relative slowdown during 
Gorbachev’s rule in the 1980s.  
 











UzbChanges in farm structure and land tenure since independence 
 
Soviet agriculture was characterized by co-existence of two farm structures: large collective 
and state farms (“farm enterprises” or “agricultural enterprises”), which represented the formal 
commercial farm sector, and very small subsistence-oriented household plots, which constituted the 
“private” sector all through the Soviet era. Land reform processes in all CIS countries substantially 
enlarged the household plots through land allocation programs and in addition created a new private 
sector of so-called “peasant farms”, which by design were larger and more commercially oriented 
than the traditional household plots. The farm structure in almost all CIS countries today is 
characterized by the existence of three farm types that span the entire spectrum of sizes: large 
corporate farms (“enterprises”) that succeeded the former collective and state farms; mid-sized 
peasant farms; and small (albeit enlarged) household plots that survived the Soviet regime. 
Household plots and peasant farms are classified as individual or family farms. By contrast, the 
successors of agricultural enterprises are referred to as corporate farms.
1 
Up to 1990, Soviet agriculture in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as in all other former Soviet 
republics, was characterized by total dominance of large collective and state farms, which controlled 
over 90% of both agricultural and arable land in the pre-reform era. The dominance of large 
agricultural enterprises began to wane when serious land reform measures were launched in the 
second half of the 1990s (after 1997-98; the bottom layer in Figures 2, 3). The share of arable land 
in enterprises dropped steadily from the Soviet level of over 90% to around 20% in 2007. Much of 
this land shifted to new emergent farm structures – the so-called peasant farms, which now control 
                                                           
1 There is a potential for terminological confusion among individual farms. In Tajikistan, peasant farms are called 
“dekhkan farms” (“dekhkan” or “dehqan” is literally a peasant in Central Asian languages). In Uzbekistan, on the other 
hand, peasant farms are called “fermery” in Uzbek or “fermerskie khozyaistva” in Russian, while the term “dekhkan 
farms” today designates the small household plots cultivated by the rural population at large. Regardless of the specific 
name used, the two types of individual farms are subject to different laws in the two countries. 60% of arable land, more than double what remains in corporate farms. The remaining 10%-20% of 
arable land is in household plots – the traditional private agriculture carried over from the Soviet era. 
Their share also increased markedly through allocation of additional land in the process of land 










Figure 2. Use of arable land by farms of 
different organizational forms in Tajikistan, 















Figure 3. Use of arable land by farms of 
different organizational forms in Uzbekistan,  
1991-2006 (million hectares). 
 
The changes in land holdings are presented for selected years in Table 1. The share of the 
individual farming sector – both household plots and peasant farms – increased from about 3% to 
30% in agricultural land since 1991. The share of individual farms – both household plots and 
peasant farms – in arable land rose from less than 10% to around 80%, but it is the newly created 
peasant farms that now control most of the arable land in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Pastures are 
still largely managed by agricultural enterprises, which is reflected in their higher share of 






















Householdsagricultural land, especially in Uzbekistan (agricultural land includes pastures as well as arable 
land).  
Table 1. Structure of land use by farm type 1991-2007 
  Agricultural land  Arable land 
Enterprises  Peasant farms  Household 
plots 
Enterprises  Peasant farms  Household 
plots 
Tajikistan             
1991  98  0  2  95  0  5 
1995  98  0  2  93  1  6 
2000  64  32  4  63  29  8 
2007  30  64  6  19  62  19 
Uzbekistan             
1991  98  0  2  92  0  8 
1995  97  1  2  88  3  9 
2000  94  4  2  72  18  10 
2006  68  29  3  25  65  11 
 
Changing structure of agricultural production 
The differential changes in the distribution of land across farms of different organizational 
types have led to striking changes in the structure of agricultural production, especially after 1997-
1998. The production in enterprises shrank dramatically from around 40% in 1997 to less than 10% 
in 2007. The production in household plots remained fairly stable at close to 60% of the total. The 
production in peasant farms took up the slack released by the shrinkage of enterprises, increasing 
from  3%  in  1997  to  about  30%  in  2007.  We  clearly  see  from  Figures  4,  5  that  agricultural 
production  has  in  fact  shifted  from  enterprises  to  peasant  farms  since  1997:  the  decrease  in 
production  in  agricultural  enterprises  (bottom  dark  gray  layer)  has  been  compensated  by  a 
corresponding increase in production in peasant farms (black layer above it), while the household 
plots (top light gray layer) have retained a dominant – and relatively constant – share throughout the 
entire  period  despite  their  small  share  in  arable  land.
2  The  observed shift in production from 
enterprises to peasant farms is consistent with the shifts in arable land in Figures 2, 3. 
                                                           
2The changes in production structure by farm type in Figures 4, 5 reflect primarily crop production, as in livestock 










Figure 4. Structure of agricultural production 















Figure 5. Structure of agricultural production 
(GAO) by farm type in Uzbekistan, 1997-
2007. 
 
Table 2. Structure of agricultural production by farm type 1997-2007 
  Tajikistan  Uzbekistan 
1997  2002  2007  1997  2002  2007 
Agricultural production             
Enterprises  46  38  14  36  26  3 
Peasant farms  3  14  28  3  10  33 
Household plots  51  48  58  61  64  64 
Crop production             
Enterprises  52  35  14  63  43  2 
Peasant farms  4  22  35  4  18  57 
Household plots  44  43  50  33  40  41 
Livestock production             
Enterprises  13  5  3  10  9  4 
Peasant farms  0  1  3  1  2  4 
Household plots  87  94  94  89  89  93 
 
Recovery of agricultural production  
The transition decline changed to recovery around 1997, and both countries registered 
impressive growth in agricultural production, which rose between 1997 and 2007 by more than 90% 
for Tajikistan and  nearly 70% for Uzbekistan  (black curve in Figures 6, 7). This growth was 



















householdsdriven entirely by the individual sector, i.e., household plots and peasant farms, as the corporate 
sector (agicultural enterprises) continued its general decline after 1997 (gray curve in Figures 6, 7).
3  
The process of agricultural reform encouraging and emphasizing transition from the traditional 
large-scale enterprises to individual farms – both peasant farms and enlarged household plots – has 
produced remarkable results in terms of production growth in agriculture. This effect of agricultural 
growth spurred by individualization of agriculture is not unique to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: it is 











Figure 6. Growth of agricultural production 
for all farms and agricultural enterprises in 
Tajikistan, 1991-2007 (GAO in percent of 












Figure 7. Growth of agricultural production 
for all farms and agricultural enterprises in 
Uzbekistan, 1991-2006 (GAO in percent of 
1991, based on constant prices). 
 
 
                                                           
3 Figures 6, 7 show the agricultural production curves for all farms and for agricultural enterprises only, as the curve for 
individual farms rises so steeply that it simply goes off the vertical scale. 
 




















percent of 1991 (based on 2003 prices)
All farms
EnterprisesProductivity gains after 1997 
Growth in agricultural output can originate from increases in the resources utilized (so-called 
extensive growth) or from increases in the efficiency with which resources are employed (intensive 
growth). For example, the value of crop production can increase as a result of increases in sown 
area, increases in the productivity with which farms utilize land, or a combination of these two 
factors. Likewise, growth in the value of livestock production can derive from increases in livestock 
inventories, increases in the productivity with which farms make use of livestock (e.g., milk yields 
achieved by dairy farmers), or a combination of the two. The rationale behind agrarian reform has 
always been the potential productivity gains due to the transfer of land and other assets from 
collective and state farms to individual farms. Therefore, an important indicator of the success of 
reforms is the presence or absence of productivity increases as a source of recovery.  
Productivity can be calculated in physical units, as the number of kilograms produced per 
hectare (for crops) or per cow (for milk). More generally, agricultural productivity is calculated in 
aggregated value terms as partial productivity of land (aggregated value of agricultural output per 
hectare of agricultural land) and partial productivity of labor (aggregated value of agricultural output 
per agricultural worker, including self-employed peasants).
4 Figures 8, 9 show the three curves that 
constitute the basis for value-based productivity calculations: agricultural production (gray curve), 
agricultural land in use (thin black curve), and agricultural labor (thick black curve). The curves 
span the period 1980-2007 and they are all normalized to index numbers with 1980=100, thus 
eliminating problems due to differences in units of measurement.  
                                                           
4 More sophisticated measures rely on total factor productivity (TFP), which aggregates the partial measures into one 
index that allows for the entire basket of resources and inputs used in agriculture. TFP is technically difficult to 












Figure 8. Basic data for productivity 
calculations: GAO, agricultural land, and 
agricultural labor for Tajikistan, 1980-2007 













Figure 9. Basic data for productivity 
calculations: GAO, agricultural land, and 
agricultural labor for Uzbekistan, 1980-2007 
(index numbers in percent of 1980). 
 
 
In both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, agricultural output (GAO) has increased dramatically 
since 1997, while agricultural land has remained generally constant (in Tajikistan) or even declined 
(in Uzbekistan). This essentially means that the partial productivity of land increased, almost 
doubling (in constant prices) between 1997 and 2007 in both countries (Figure 10). Agricultural 
labor, unlike agricultural land, showed steady increase in Tajikistan since 1980, but its increase 
lagged behind the growth in agricultural output after 1997 and as a result the productivity of 
agricultural labor also increased between 1997 and 2007, although more moderately than the 
productivity of land (Figure 10). In Uzbekistan, the steady increase of agricultural labor during the 
Soviet period changed to moderate decline after 1990 (Figure 9), which combined with growth in 
agricultural production led to a robust increase in partial productivity of labor after 1997 (Figure 
11).  




















GAOAgricultural reforms in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are thus seen to have had a highly 
beneficial outcome, producing robust growth in both production and productivity. Another 
dimension that needs to be checked in future work is the impact of these processes on rural incomes 











Figure 10. Productivity of land and labor in 
Tajikistan, 1991-2007 (GAO per hectare of 
agricultural land and per agricultural worker, 













Figure 11. Productivity of land and labor in 
Uzbekistan, 1980-2006 (GAO per hectare of 
agricultural land and per agricultural worker, 
all farms, in percent of 1980).  
 
 
The case for land reform and the potential yield improving effects can be seen in Figure 12 
which shows (for Tajikistan) the huge differences in productivity of land between household plots 
on  one  side  and  enterprises  and  peasant  farms  on  the  other.  Household  plots  –  the  undisputed 
individual farms in all CIS countries – consistently achieve much higher levels of land productivity: 
agricultural land in household plots is utilized 20 to 50 times more productively than in farms of 
other types. Further redistribution of land to household plots could substantially increase average 
productivity in agriculture, thus leading to a large increase in agricultural production.  































laborFigure 12 also illustrates that farms of all three types in Tajikistan achieved increases in land 
productivity since 1999. While growth in agricultural production was driven entirely by the 
individual sector (see Figure 6), the growth in land productivity appears to be driven by farms of all 
organizational forms. At the same time it is noteworthy that peasant farms in Tajikistan are not 
doing better than agricultural enterprises on average. This puzzling result may stem from the fact 
that at least one-third of the peasant farms in Tajikistan are not really individual farms at all: they 
are collective dehkan farms (partnerships) created in the process of reorganization of traditional 
farm enterprises and their incentives are closer to those of corporate farms than individual farms. 
Many of these collective dehkan farms were only cosmetically reorganized and the management 
structures have remained unchanged  (FAO 2004). Under these circumstances we should not be 
surprised that the productivity of peasant farms in Tajikistan, taken as a heterogeneous group, is not 
different from that of the farm enterprises they succeeded. Future analytical efforts should attempt to 












Figure 12. Productivity of land by farm type in 
Tajikistan, 1991-2007 (GAO per hectare of 
agricultural land, by type of farm, somoni per ha 
in constant 2003 prices, log scale).  
 
 
Productivity as a source of production growth 
To assess the sources of growth since 1997, we applied the standard Solow growth 
accounting methodology, which separates growth in output into two components: growth in the 
resource base (extensive) and growth in productivity (intensive). Tables 3, 4 show the change in the 









Householdsvalue of crop production (in constant prices) since 1997 and the corresponding change in the 
resource base (represented by the sown area). The growth in production not accounted for by the 
change in the resource component is by definition the contribution from increases in productivity. 
The decomposition in Table 3 shows that 55% of growth in crop production in Tajikistan is 
attributable to increases in land area, while the remaining 45% can be attributed to increases in 
productivity. The numbers for livestock production are essentially the same (57% due to change in 
herd size, 43% due to changes in productivity). 
For Uzbekistan as a whole, the increase in aggregate value of crop production was achieved 
in parallel with a decrease in sown area (Table 4). In other words, growth in agricultural output 
occurred despite a decrease in resources, and this may be interpreted as indicating that the entire 
change in output (100%) was attributable to productivity, with no contribution whatsoever from 
change in resources.  
There are large differences in the contribution of productivity growth by farm type and by 
country. Yet individual farms seem to be associated with larger productivity changes: household 
plots and peasant farms in Uzbekistan achieve implied productivity change of 1.6-1.7 (compared 
with 1.4 for enterprises), and  in Tajikistan household plots – individual farms par excellence – 
achieve an implied productivity change of 2.1 (peasant farms in Tajikistan are a heterogeneous 
groups consisting of both individual and collective dehkan farms, which may account for their lower 
productivity change component: see the previous discussion in connection with Figure 12).  
Table 3. Changes in output and resources in crop production for farms of different types in Tajikistan, 1997-2006 
(2006/1997, times) 
  Tajikistan  Agricultural 
enterprises 
Peasant farms  Household 
plots 
Aggregate value of crop production  2.0  0.6  17.2  2.3 
Sown area  1.1  0.4  16.7  1.1 
Implied productivity change  1.8  1.3  1.0  2.1 
Contribution of change in resources 
to change in production (%) 
55  78  97  48 
Percent of aggregate crop production 
in 2006 (%) 
100  14  36  50 
 Table 4. Changes in output and resources in crop production for farms of different types in Uzbekistan, 1997-
2007 (2007/1997, times) 
  Uzbekistan  Agricultural 
enterprises 
Peasant farms  Household 
plots 
Aggregate value of crop production  2.04  0.04  19.83  1.84 
Sown area  0.86  0.03  11.45  1.17 
Implied productivity change  2.4  1.4  1.7  1.6 
Contribution of change in resources 
to change in production (%) 
0  70  58  64 
Percent of aggregate crop production 
in 2006 (%) 
100  2  57  41 
 
Tables 3, 4 confirm that the recovery of agricultural production in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
has been driven to a considerable by productivity increases (intensive growth), less by changes in 
resources (extensive growth). They also confirm that the majority of productivity change 
contributing to GAO growth has come from individual farms (household plots and peasant farms in 
Uzbekistan; household plots only in Tajikistan) rather than from corporate farm types.  
 
Conclusion 
The empirical results of this paper have important implications for the ongoing policy debate 
between the supporters of large corporate farms, who continue to advocate economies of scale, and 
the supporters of smaller family farms, who emphasize the advantages of individual incentives. This 
debate is not limited to Central Asia, and it is relevant also for the rest of the CIS. The results will 
hopefully inform this ongoing debate and incrementally add to the growing body of evidence that 
highlights the performance advantages of family farms in transition countries.  
The analysis in this paper is based on aggregate country statistics. Ongoing work not 
reported here utilizes cross-section data from several farm surveys conducted in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan by international organizations (Asian Development Bank, FAO, UNDP, USAID, World 
Bank) between 2003 and 2008. From these survey data we intend to calculate partial land and labor 
productivity, total factor productivity (based on both accounting data and the production function 
approach), and technical efficiency scores for farms of different organizational forms. We believe that these future results will demonstrate that, contrary to established convictions among decision 
makers in Central Asia and the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the large 
corporate farms (former collectives) are not more productive than the smaller family farms. 
Moreover, some subsectors of the individual farm sector (specifically, the small household plots) are 
resoundingly more productive than the large corporate farms. These anticipated findings for two 
Central Asian countries will reinforce recent results for Ukraine (Lerman et al. 2007), Moldova 
(Lerman and Sutton 2008), Russia (Lerman and Schreinemachers 2005), and the United States 
(Ahearn et al. 2002), which demonstrate that large (corporate) farms do not perform better than 
small (family) farms. 
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